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Introduction 
Economic theory has long assumed that basic institutions, such as constitutional 
rules, have systematic effects on a number of economic development variables, such as 
the state‟s budget deficit, the growth rate, and income levels. (Voight 2008). However, 
policy makers were caught off-guard for the challenges of the second law and 
development movement, which began after the collapse of the socialist systems in 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Over the past 20 years, the scope of legal 
reforms undertaken in transition economies has been unprecedented, yet the results of 
these reforms have been mixed. Currently, there is a broad consensus that the impact of 
the legal reform efforts has been, at best, limited. {Berkowitz 2003 see also Hendley 
1999; Pistor, Raiser et al (2000); Murrell (2001)}. 
In China, the reform process began with the acknowledgement that two kinds of 
legal reforms were needed. First, the (re-)introduction of a “rule by law” which would put 
an end to the arbitrary, particularistic back room deals and violence connected to the “era 
of the Cultural Revolutions.” Second, these standards could be used as a governance tool 
to increase the state sector‟s efficiency. The central government would gain access to 
firms that were no longer subject to the administrative control mechanisms of a socialist 
economy. Access evokes control; the government would now be able to pursue its own 
policies throughout the newly ostensibly independent non-state sector.  This policy was 
iterated in the 1982 Constitution of the People‟s Republic of China (CPRC), which 
insisted on public ownership of the means of production. (Potter 1994; 1999). However, 
over time, the constitution has developed and distanced itself from a low recognition 
standard of the non-state sector to a much stronger recognition of the private sector. 
These changes found their manifestation in the General Principle of Civil Law of 1986, 
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which was modeled after the German Civil Code (Clarke et al. 2006). In 2004, the CPRC 
was further amended to incorporate explicit recognition of private property rights. In 
other words, legal reforms have evolved from enabling governance to recognizing private 
rights that, in principle and to a degree, are inviolable.  
The question therefore arises: which legal system has been (re-) introduced in 
Reform-China? A short overview of legal traditions within China shows that there is no 
shortage of different legal systems. In the 20
th
 century alone, China has seen twelve 
constitutions, eight of which were between 1908 and 1954 (Killion 2005). However, the 
blueprints for a new legal system in China are not restricted to its own recent past (e.g. 
Potter 1994). The German civil law had been introduced by Guomingdang China in the 
1930s. Hong Kong utilized common law, which entered mainland China in the 1980s as 
part of international contracting between Chinese and Anglo-Saxon multinationals 
(Clarke et al. 2006, Heugins et al 2008). It has been argued that the 1982 CPRC was 
based upon the 1952 model (Killion 2005; Potter 1994) meaning socialist law was 
introduced to China via the USSR constitutional model.  
Therefore, for analytical reasons, and, following the Legal Origin Theory (LOT), 
four legal families (La Porta et al. 2008) can be distinguished in present day China: 
Socialist law, Common law (Hong Kong- style), German civil law, and indigenous 
Chinese legal tradition. Furthermore, LOT shows that a legal system‟s origin, i.e. the 
legal family that shapes the development of “national legislation,” affects the formation 
of (economic) institutions that in turn influence both economic performance and 
economic structures (La Porta et al. 2008). It is for this reason that the question of both 
which and how a new legal system emerges is of more than only academic interest.  
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A market economy is more than private property rights, private, voluntary exchange and 
the right to pool resources for establishing and investing in private firms. In a  market 
economy, politics set defaults (see the Public Choice literature; a good introduction is 
Mueller 1997). For example, it is as forbidden to employ the price mechanism for 
property rights to producers as is the formation of cartels or damaging the environment. 
Moreover, when a market economy sets defaults, these defaults occur within the 
institutional constraints of the (constitutional) legal system. Thus, which variance of a 
market economy will emerge depends inter alia on the legal system chosen, a choice that, 
as LOT further argues, is itself constrained by the legal family from which the national 
legal system originates. For example, neither the traditional nor the socialist legal family 
offers a blueprint in which to base legislation that fits market economy requirements, 
such as rights of private exchange and contracting. The question of both the presence and 
the relative influence of legal families is of paramount importance since the manner in 
which both the legal system and its constituent market economy continues to develop, or 
overall system‟s perspective on development, is derived from the legal families.  
To answer this question asks for a frame that first discriminates between the four 
legal families and then positions legal reform post-1979. The empirical source is 
commercial law which contributes to the formation of economic institutions. Within 
commercial law, national legislation is examined, since the analytical focus is law on the 
books that affects the economic system as a whole. This article concentrates on verifying 
legal family presence; the process of verification also lends itself to a rough assessment 
of legal system development drivers, referred to as cases of conflict. This assessment may 
then be utilized as a benchmark for the legal system. In other words, this assessment may 
be used to determine if the legal system is developing in accordance with a specific legal 
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family. This frame deviates from orthodox LOT in two ways. First, it analyzes the 
interactions between multiple legal families. Second, it begins to explore how these 
interactions drive the development of the legal system, which will be the subject of future 
research. Orthodox LOT assumes that each country‟s legal system is derived from a 
single legal family, which means that indigenous legal traditions are not discussed as 
legal families.  Therefore, an important theoretical contribution is made through the 
discussion of multiple legal families and the Chinese indigenous legal tradition.  
The paper proceeds as follows. First, a conceptual framework that discusses legal 
origins theory, legal families, and the methodology used to identify legal families in 
China (sec. 2). Second, an empirical framework examines the cornerstones of Chinese 
business law and cases of conflict (sec. 3). The conclusion shall stress the further research 
questions posed by this paper (sec. 4).  
 
II. Conceptual Framework 
II.1: Legal Origins Theory and Legal Families in China 
Over the past decade, LOT has produced a considerable body of research 
suggesting that the historical origin of a nation‟s laws shapes economic institutions and, 
eventually, economic outcomes (La Porta et al.2008).
i
 For example, LOT documents that 
the legal rules protecting investors vary systematically among nations; this variation is 
dependent on the rules legal origin. Common law countries offer better protection than 
civil law countries (La Porta et al. 2008, 286). 
 Faced with the question of how to explain the pervasive influence of legal origins 
on economic outcomes, LOT defines legal origin as a style of social control of economic 
life. There are two types of law, or means of social control, civil and common law. Civil 
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law is considered to be “policy implementing,” in so far as its overall goal is the 
implementation of state desired allocations. (La Porta et al. 2008, 286; Damaska 1986). 
Common law is regarded as dispute resolving since its overall goal is the resolution of 
private market conflicts. From these legal origins, LOT carves out legal families, which 
are blueprints for the development of a legal system. In other words, the legal family is 
either a proxy for the manner in which the chosen style of social control is implemented  
or a guiding vision for how legal system‟s instruments select specific outcomes. The legal 
families are the English, or Common law family; the French, or civil law family; the 
German family; the Scandinavian family; and the Socialist family. The German and 
Scandinavian families are a mixture of common and civil law. The socialist family 
originated after WWII following the formation of the Socialist bloc. In the 1990s, most 
transition economies choose to return to either their pre-Russian Revolution or pre-World 
War II legal systems or adopt a new legal system. Generally speaking, the pattern of 
return/adoption shows that transition economies either utilized the French or German 
family. 
According to LOT, the following processes are responsible for the spread of legal 
families: colonization, transmission, or adoption. Currently, there are four total legal 
families, three foreign, one indigenous, sourced to present day China‟s legal system 
(Clarke et al. 2006). The indigenous legal tradition refers to all laws prior to the 
republican revolution. It includes the Tang Code from the 7
th
 century as well the Qing 
dynasty‟s (1644-1912) legal code.  The Guomingdang government, in their drive for 
modernization in the 1930s, imported the German Civil Code, thereby adopting a civil 
law family. The Soviet legal family was introduced to the People‟s Republic of China 
(PRC) when the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) heavily borrowed from Soviet law in 
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the 1950s (Schurman 1965). The Soviet legal family entered the PRC through adoption 
while in Taiwan the civil law tradition survived. In contrast, the common law‟s impact 
upon the development of the Chinese legal system stems from not only Hong Kong, but 
also British and US-American firms, entering the Chinese market.
1
 Common law entered 
China through transmission via business relations rather than adoption by national 
legislation.  
II.2: Substantive form and Functional Value of a Legal System 
When discriminating between legal families, it is useful to first stress the 
distinction between the law‟s functional value and its substantive form (see also 
Peerenboom 1999). Functional value refers to the formal or instrumental aspects of a 
legal system, namely those features that a legal system must possess in order to function 
effectively. Laws must be general, clear, consistent, stable, and enforceable and for this 
reason need accompanying institutions that ensure this standard. Thus, for example, a 
legislature and the accompanying government machinery are necessary to ensure the 
public promulgation of law. In addition, the congruence between laws on the books and 
the actual practice of law assumes that an institutional structure, usually the courts, is 
capable of implementing and enforcing laws. (Peerenboom, 1999). 
The substantive form refers to the codification of (political) ethics and morality 
within the law. Summarizing such political ethics with the help of general principles can 
at best serve as ex post descriptors. Principles often remain too abstract for discriminating 
                                                 
1
 We leave aside the problem of Shanghai where between 1906 and 1949 the 
International Settlement introduced different legal families via colonialization (see Howe 
1981). A preliminary distinction may be drawn between the law of the land and the law 
of an international settlement or that the presence of foreign law does not necessarily lead 
to transmission or adoption by the host nation.  
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between legal families or obfuscate the differences between legal families that are 
necessary for an empirical analysis. References to individualism (human rights), 
separation of powers, and democratic voting appear in both the common and civil law 
families. The doctrine of separation of powers is illustrative for the problem of utilizing 
codified political ethics as an analytical tool. Under this model, the state is divided into 
branches, each with separate and independent powers and areas of responsibility. An 
empirical observation that a government is divided into branches only informs of the 
doctrine‟s presence versus illuminating a distinct legal family‟s presence. For example, in 
England, the executive and cabinet members are drawn from the legislature. The 
executive and legislative branches are fused, although the judiciary is independent. In 
France, the executive appoints the Prime Minister whose office must reflect the 
parliamentary majority. The executive and legislative branches are fused, to a degree, and 
the judicial branch is independent. The same doctrine with a similar manifestation is 
observed in both nations although each nation‟s legal system is based on a distinct legal 
family.  
However, empirical observations of the substantive form‟s effect on economic 
activity are helpful in determining the relationship between the law and the political 
regime. The ex post descriptor becomes an analytical tool for qualifying that relationship 
in a specific segment of the legal system, such as economic activity. Constraints and 
opportunities, as translated through the law, may be examined and interpreted; for 
example, in the most general manner possible, law on contracting may be interpreted as 
either policy allocating or market resolving. As previously stated, these goals reflect the 
orientation of the civil and common law families.  In the substantive form of the law 
addressing economic activities, three aspects can be singled out: economic exchange and 
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business arrangements, forms of government, and conceptions of economic (human) 
rights (Peerenboom 1999; 2006). These aspects are inter-related as the following example 
from Reform China shows (all examples from Potter, 339). Unlike Socialist law, which 
only knows transactions between hierarchically unequal partners, the new laws 
envisioned transactions between equal partners. Art. 5 in the 1981 Economic Contract 
Law stipulated that contracting partners are equal and enjoy the right to agree on prices. 
Consequently, state agencies, which were no longer superior economic agents, could not 
overrule the contracting partners‟ price agreement. Successive regulations and court 
rulings in similar cases defined the range of „contractual right.‟ Equal rights in 
contracting and private exchange are based on the equal rights of all natural persons 
which, non-surprisingly, made its re-appearance in the 1986 General Principles of Civil 
Law (Art.3). In this case, the (German) civil law tradition was revived with its individual 
rights, empowering natural persons in economic activities, such as trading and 
contracting. In order to provide this empowerment, the law has to ensure that voluntary 
exchanges and transactions may occur. Subsequently, these rights change the form of 
government, as they set defaults for state non-intervention; these rights limit state control 
by defining individual liberties. Remains of Socialist law are found in provisions that the 
rights of economic actors are defined by the CCP in the form of „political stability‟ or 
civic obligations.  
This example shows that the development of a legal system‟s substantive form 
will influence the development of its functional value. Voluntary exchange and 
contracting rights contradicted the CCP‟s insistence on political control over economic 
development. The corollary may also prove to be true. The CCP continues to endorse a 
Socialist legal system while simultaneously prioritizing commercial development, if not a 
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market economy. Clearly, both commercial development and a market economy would 
profit from a better functioning legal system, thus stressing the functional value of laws. 
One result of these conflicting concepts was, until 2004, the creation of substantive law 
that exempted private property. At the same time, the functional framework was altered 
by developing and protecting institutions for voluntary economic exchange. In this 
example, analysis of the substantive form identified the presence of the socialist and civil 
legal family, and pointed to areas of influence in the current legal system. 
A distinction must be made between the presence of one or more legal family in a 
legal system, and the influence each legal family‟ exerts on legal and economic 
institution building. Therefore, the mere identification of a legal families‟ presence in a 
legal system is insufficient when it comes to calculating that families influence on the 
legal system. An examination of a legal system‟s substantive and functional aspects is 
necessary in order to determine influence in addition to presence. The following four 
factors will determine the presence of a legal family in a legal system: the relationship 
between the law and the political regime; who writes the law; who enforces the law; and 
who mediates the law (dispute settlement). 
 
Table 1: Features of legal systems 
Substantive Form Functional Value 
The relationship between the law and the political 
regime 
Who writes the law 
 Who enforces the law 
 Who mediates the law 
 
 12 
 The connection between the three factors (who writes, enforces and mediates law) 
and the requirement of the law being functional enough to ensure its application, namely 
being general, clear, consistent, stable, and enforceable are as follows:  
 
Table 2: Functional Value Factors 
General Clear Consistent Stable Enforceable 
Who writes the law Who writes the law Who writes the law Who enforces the 
law 
Who enforces the 
law 
 Who mediates the 
law 
Who mediates the 
law 
 Who mediates the 
law 
  
Writing law 
The actors that are empowered to write the law will help to determine the 
generality, clarity, and consistency of the law. In the traditional legal family, the emperor 
alone, treating the kingdom as a single „jurisdiction,‟ was able to write the law. However, 
informal consensus writing, brokered by local government agencies and social groups, is 
also present in the traditional legal family. The different dynasties favored different forms 
of decentralization; the Ming-dynasty was a highly decentralized state, while the Qing 
dynasty modified the Ming-dynasty‟s version (Zelin 1984). In this case, the notion of 
generality needs to be clarified: The arm of the law did not go beyond the boundaries of 
local communities, which wrote and applied their own norms, limiting the notion of 
generality. Conflicting laws could be solved only be writing petitions to the emperor who 
subsequently served as final arbitrator. The emperor, through the „mandate of heaven,‟ 
was the source of all natural law; consequently, when the emperor wrote law, it was 
addressed to the collective unit of the people, or more accurately, his subjects. The 
generality of this written law, as previously stated, stopped at the village gates. 
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Although the law writing power was also centralized in the socialist family, it was 
also diffused through the party and state agencies and threatened by intra-party conflicts 
(Schurman 1965, Senger 2008). Formally speaking, the National People‟s Congress is the 
only law writing institutions but both the Cultural Revolution and the Tian‟anmen 
incident in 1989 are evidence that the CCP may, at times, violate proper procedures 
(Peerenboom 1999). Likewise, following the notion of ideologically defined 
contradictions present in the socialist system, there were two separate socialist legal 
systems. One system was for the „enemies of the people‟ and the other for the „people,‟ 
namely those who could be re-educated via sanctions as prescribed in the law (Senger 
2008). In a similar manner to the traditional family, the legal system addressed the 
collective units of either the „people‟ or the „people‟s enemies.‟ Violating notions of 
clarity, and generality was the rule rather than the norm in recent Chinese history. 
Problems were to be solved via new constitutions and political norms (zhengce) within 
the Party rather than within the National People‟s Congress (NPC). 
The civil law family features a national legislature as the ostensible law-writing 
agency, although that power is also delegated to the administrative bureaus. Several 
parties hold the law writing power in the common law family, namely the legislature, the 
judiciary, and quasi-judicial administrative bureaus. It is worth stressing that a key 
distinction between the common and civil law families is the common law principle of 
stare decisis, defined as precedent is binding as law (Sinclair, 2007). In the civil law 
family, if the subject matter of the dispute is outside of the coded law, the judiciary may 
not have the legal authority to pass a judgment but will refer it back to legislative bodies 
(Apple, 1994). Conversely, the common law judge has the authority to rule on an issue of 
first impression, defined as a case in which the subject matter of the dispute falls outside 
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of the coded law. This authority stems from the common law judges law writing power, 
which is based on the principle of stare decisis. Since the previous rulings of the judge 
are the law then the judge‟s present ruling, even when the subject matter of the ruling is 
outside of the codified law, must also be the law. The civil law judge lacks that authority 
In both the civil and common law families, courts supervise the notions of clarity 
and generality and, in case these norms are violated, transfer the legislation back to the 
legislature. Likewise, in both systems, the law addresses individual natural persons whose 
rights the law is asked to protect, rather than collective units, such as the village, the clan, 
the production brigade, or firms. 
 
Enforcing Law 
An examination of the actors that actually enforce the law reveals the degree to 
which the law is stable and enforceable. A law may be viewed as stable if it is enforced. 
If a rule is not enforced, then the question of whether the rule is actually a rule arises 
(Aoki, 2001). Within the traditional legal family, the imperial government, representing 
an extension of the emperor‟s will, is responsible for enforcing the laws. However, the 
imperial government would delegate that power to provincial and local magistrates (Zelin 
1984), clans, or other social groups.  
In the Socialist family, the Party and various state organs, such as specific 
bureaus, are the responsible agents for enforcement. Courts and judges are regarded as a 
branch of the state administration. Subsequently, the means for enforcing the law are the 
Party‟s Disciplinary commission and its nomenclatura system in addition to the usual law 
enforcement agencies, such as prosecutors and courts. The plaintiff is almost a 
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government agency to the effect that those with good „connections‟ to political agencies 
can expect to be treated with leniency. 
Both the civil and common law system feature a court system, a professional 
police force, and a professional prosecutorial and public defense body. However, in the 
civil law family, citizens that sue the state are also responsible for ensuring that laws are 
enforced. Part of enforcement is delegated to state agencies, which are allowed to use 
„fines‟. Enforcement and sanctions in commercial law in both systems employ monetary 
sanctions in the form of fines, restitution and compensation for the harmed party rather 
than employing a penal code. Enforcement further depends on a party, claiming to have 
been harmed and its willingness to take redress by law. 
   
Dispute settlement 
Decisions from the dispute settlement system must be both clear and consistent, 
which contribute to the overall dependability of the system. If economic actors perceive 
the system as dependable, they are more likely to “opt in” to the system (Peerenboom 
2001). Otherwise, economic actors will search for other (social or political) means to 
solve contractual or business related conflicts. In order to distinguish between the legal 
families, the focus of the examination must fall on structural traits common to all dispute 
settlement systems, codification and hierarchy. While codification determines both the 
persons and the subjects that may be arbitrated, hierarchy (pre-) determines the outcome 
in a conflict of laws scenario. 
 Codification is defined as the degree to which a dispute‟s subject matter is 
incorporated within a nation‟s laws. In other words, it is the degree to which the specific 
subject of a dispute is recognized as a legal matter, the disputants are recognized as legal 
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persons, and the sanctions follow rules as prescribed by the law. The relevant law then 
decides the following: who may appear in court, generally legal persons with standing;
2
 if 
there is an actual controversy that may be decided by a court in the case; and who 
arbitrates the dispute, generally the judiciary and private judiciary alternatives. Hierarchy 
refers to the hierarchy of laws.  
In the traditional family, codification was extremely important. Chinese law had 
been passed down as a code from the Tang dynasty through the Qing dynasty but was 
limited to administrative procedures and the penal code. To the degree that either the 
dispute or the legal persons were not recognized by the code, they were, quite literally, 
outside the law. Hierarchy of law was also present, although in a more rudimentary form, 
as the emperor‟s pronouncements were at the hierarchy‟s highest point. Civil matters 
were not codified (exception land deals and land lease) and extra judicial persons, such as 
villages, were empowered to settle disputes (Chen, 2005, Zelin 1984).  
In the Socialist legal family, the law is a tool of party control. The primary 
method of dispute settlement, at least for civil matters, was politicized mediation (Chen, 
2005) or disciplinary measures of the Party legitimized by the nomenclatura system 
(Edin, 2003).Both the traditional and the Socialist legal family share in the dominance of 
criminal law in legal codes, which left dispute settlement in civil, i.e. economic matters, 
to local political or social groups.  
 Generally speaking, the common and civil law families share some similarities in 
terms of codification and hierarchy. In terms of hierarchy, both families have adopted a 
                                                 
2
 Every natural person is a legal person. In this context, legal personhood is sometimes 
extended to composites of individuals, such as firms (Deiser, 1908). Standing, or locus 
standi, is the ability of a party to demonstrate to the court sufficient connection to and 
harm from the law or action challenged to support that party's participation in the case. 
(Warth v Seldin, 1975). 
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supremacy principle in which the laws of the national government supersede the laws of 
the local governments. There are also several distinctions. The court structure in common 
law families may be drawn as a pyramid with the “highest” court at the top. The typical 
civil law judicial system is represented as a set of non connecting distinct structures. 
(Apple 1994). For example, the German model, which was explicitly adopted by Reform 
China, relies on several independent court systems, each with its own supreme court. 
(Apple 1994). In terms of codification, the civil law family relies on the legislature to 
create and codify the law. The common law family, as part of the Separation of Powers 
doctrine, both the legislature and the judiciary codify the law.  
 In China, certain state agencies, such as the National People‟s Congress, as well 
as some administrative bureaus, possess the law writing power. In theory, legislation 
issued by administrative bureaus is subordinate to that issued by state agencies 
(Legislation Law, 2000). The Legislation Law of the People‟s Republic of China 
(Legislation Law) defines the principles of legislation and the validity and the priority of 
law and administrative regulations. The hierarchy of law, as defined by the Legislation 
Law, is as follows. The Constitution is at the top of the legal pyramid, then the national 
laws issued by the National People‟s Congress. Following are the administrative 
regulations, which are issued by the State Council, and then local decrees, which are 
issued by local People's Congresses. At the bottom are administrative and local rules, 
which are issued by an administrative agency or by a local People's Government. 
 To sum up, each Legal Family represents a blue print for the development of a legal 
system. As a style of social control, each blueprint offers specific constraints and 
opportunities for development. Identifying the presence of a legal family within a legal 
system depends upon recognizing those constraints and developments. It is worth noting 
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that the legal family affects both the substantial form and the functional values of the 
national legal system. Development in substantial form may influence the functional 
value of legislation. In other words, once a substantive form of law is decided upon, the 
law must functionally execute those substantive demands. The corollary is that functional 
developments may also lead to substantive changes.  
 It is worth stressing that China‟s legal system is not only currently in flux but also 
deviates from other norms as follows. First, China‟s government made a rational 
conscious choice to pursue a market economy and implemented a legal system to do so. 
Second, there is a conscious choice of legal reforms in pursuit of this goal. As opposed to 
formal LOT, wherein the direction of a legal system is determined in history, the 
direction of the Chinese legal system is determined in the present. Therefore, the manner 
in which the Chinese legal system deviates from LOT is now an empirical question for 
further research. 
 
III. Empirical Framework 
III.1 Cornerstones of Business Law 
 China introduced itself to a market economy due to its promised functionality, 
namely higher growth rates, technological change and innovation, and the ability to catch 
up to developed economies in the West and Japan. The socialist legal family had offered 
the means for an efficient state sector. Moving from a socialist economy to a market 
economy meant the emergence of private entrepreneurship, which asked for additional 
laws and implementation tools. It is worth noting that the specific laws meant to facilitate 
the nascent market economy were, at first, difficult to reconcile with the (socialist) legal 
system. The introduction of the General Principles of Civil Law in1986 (GCL) signified a 
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change in the nature of the Chinese legal system. With the GCL, two legal families, 
socialist and civil law, were now present in the legal system. 
The most striking part of the GCL was the acknowledgment of individual “natural” 
persons, to whom rights and obligations were allocated, as the subject of law. That the 
GPCL is not a copy of the German civil law as evidenced by the missing right of 
assembly, which is key to the unionization of the work force. Unionization is regarded as 
a threat to political stability. Those rights included: 
 Private Property Rights: the right to embark on voluntary exchange, including the 
right to select business partners, and the right to claim (residual) profit. 
 Private Exchange and contracting rights: the right to agree on prices. 
 Private Investment, Corporate Governance: the right to transfer assets via 
inheritance and invest in self-chosen business ventures. 
As previously stated, the post 1982 Constitution legal reforms were characterized by 
an attempt to ensure political control over society while adopting the civil law tradition. 
Western Firms and investors could not be expected to comply with such laws and 
enforcement procedures. The political leadership revived „extra-territoriality‟ via special 
laws and the establishment of Special Economic Zones. It has been in these special 
jurisdictions where common law practices appeared, either through Hong Kong 
companies or international law firms. Their recommendations for particular mediation 
and arbitration practices became established practices over time.  
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Therefore, the different legal families have influenced the development of business 
law in China at different times. The following table shows the emergence of national 
legislation that grants the integral market economy rights as discussed above.  
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Table 3: Emergence of New Commercial Law 
1979- 
2005 
Private property rights Private exchange, 
Contracting 
Private 
investment, 
Corporate 
governance 
1979 Regulation: collective property rights 
to townships and villages 
Establ. State Administration for Industry and 
Commerce monitoring economic contacts 
Sino-Foreign Equity 
Joint venture law 
1981  Contract law: for “legal” persons (firms and 
agencies) 
Regulation: private 
investment 
1982 Regulation: individual firms (geti hu) 
up to 8 employees 
Trade Mark Law  
1984 Patent Law   
1986 Law: legalizing transfer of use rights 
on land 
Contract law including individual economic 
actors 
Bankruptcy Law 
(1986-88), Law on 
Wholly Foreign 
Owned companies 
  General Principles of Civil Law (re-introducing 
the German Civil Code) 
 
1988 Constitution: legalizing land leasing; 
 
 Regulation new 
organizational forms 
of firms: private 
ownership, 
partnerships, 
ltd.liability firms 
 Regulation on Private Enterprises  SOEs subject to legal 
(instead of 
administrative) control 
1989  Administrative litigation law (activities by gov. 
agencies need to be based on a legal basis) 
 
1990 Regulation: transfer of use rights in 
urban sector 
  
 Copy Right Law   
1992   Company Law 
1993  Economic contract Law (excl. individual econ. 
Actors) 
Regulations on 
issuance and Trading 
and Stock, i.e. law on 
securities 
1994  Foreign Trade Law  
1995   Security Law making 
secured lending 
possible 
1997  Price Law Partnership Law 
   Anti-subsidy law 
1998   Stock exchange, 
Securities Law 
1999 Individual entrepreneurship Law Law: Unfair Competition  
  Contract Law: domestic and foreign, firms and 
individual economic actors 
 
2001 Constitution: Party membership for 
entrepreneurs 
WTO law  
2003 Licensing law   
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III.2 Cases of Conflict  
 Cases of conflict are defined as specific legal situations, that when resolved, lead 
to the positioning of activities within a select body of law.  The situation may be a case 
decided by the judiciary, legislation, or the decision to opt for one form of dispute 
settlement over another. In many cases, the properties of a total system are not the mere 
supposition of the individual sub-system‟s properties onto the whole of the system. As 
previously mentioned, the various legal families are neither legal systems nor bodies of 
law; they are conceptual subsystems that influence the constraints and opportunities 
available in a body of law. Through the cooperation of the subsystems, new qualities of 
the total system are produced. Often these qualities cannot be formulated by the means of 
the subsystems alone. (Haken, 1980). Of course, bringing a case to court involves 
specific legal agents: clients with a dispute, lawyers / law firms, and courts. The agents‟ 
action in pursuing a case redefines the borders or areas of overlap between the legal 
families in the selected body of law. In other words, a case of conflict is a flashpoint 
between the separate development agendas of the legal families. The resolution of this 
flashpoint will lead to the empowerment of a single development agenda, the creation of 
qualities that will then affect the entire system.  
It is worth stressing that the cases of conflict theory, as outlined above, at this 
point in the research on multiple legal families, appears to be conceptually distinct from 
regulatory jurisdictional competition. In many cases, a system changes its macroscopic 
state when external conditions are changed. When describing regulatory jurisdictional 
competition, a case representing changes in the external conditions leads to innovation 
and strengthens the competitive advantage of one regulatory jurisdiction. Competition 
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occurs through agency. When discussing cases of conflict, competition does not 
necessarily occur. The configuration of the overall legal system is stable against small 
perturbations imposed on the system. However, when a critical point is reached, this 
stability property is lost and the total system tries to find a new kind of collective 
individual motion. As opposed to the subsystems competing with a winner and loser, 
development of individual motion occurs over time. The agents that argue a case are 
empowering a single strategy because they are developing a unitary system, which cannot 
progress under contradictory strategies. When a case of conflict occurs, a single strategy 
for the new individual motion of the separate subsystems is empowered but the separate 
subsystems remain. When regulatory competition occurs, it involves a process of 
selection and retention dependant upon favorable variations, and certain regulatory 
jurisdictions may die out.   
The following two examples are illustrative of the above theory. The first 
example draws from dispute settlement in the general sense. First, entering a case into the 
formal dispute settlement system represents that firm‟s choice of the formal system as 
opposed to the alternative, the informal dispute settlement system. According to 
traditional Confucian morality, going to court is a sign of weakness. Clearly, some 
element of choice on the part of the firm may be deduced. Showing weakness is offset by 
the possible end result offered by the formal system. This interaction between systems 
shows that conflict between legal families‟ development agendas is possible. Of course, 
this picture is not one of a total system composed of subsystems but separate systems in 
which agents position themselves in order to maximize benefits. However, as previously 
stated, judicial mechanisms in the indigenous tradition were only developed for criminal 
matters. In addition, not all commercial disputes lead to the dispute settlement system 
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regardless of that systems formal or informal character. Therefore, when opting for any 
form of dispute settlement, firms have engaged in a process in which there are 
overlapping non competitive subsystems, the formal system back by the state and the 
informal system backed by the community. When conflict builds due to this overlap, this 
conflict allows legal agencies to expand on the powers afforded to them by the law. 
For example, on June 28, 2001, the Judicial Committee of the Supreme People‟s 
Court adopted the following Reply.
3
 The Chief Judge argued that the Reply established a 
precedent for the use of the Constitution as the subject of judicial proceedings and the 
legal basis of judgment. (Ulric, 2005). The use of precedent is part of the common law 
family‟s principle of stare decises. The precedent protects the fundamental rights of the 
people guaranteed in the Constitution from any possible legal conversion – the 
Constitutions guarantees are a standard against which other laws must be judged 
(justiciability). (Ulric, 2005).    
 The Reply was controversial. The Supreme People‟s Court has explicit possession 
of the power of judicial interpretation but that power is limited to the interpretation of 
laws and regulations arising in the actual case. (Ulric, 2005). The National People‟s 
Congress and the Standing Party of the National Committee possess the explicit power to 
interpret the Constitution and laws of China. (Ulric, 2005; Article 127, CPRC). 
Therefore, although the Reply empowers the judicial system through a grant of judicial 
review, that grant is in tension with its Constitutional powers of judicial interpretation.  
                                                 
3
 The Official Reply of the Supreme People‟s Court On Whether the Civil Liabilities Shall Be Borne for the 
Infringement Upon a Citizen‟s Basic Right of Receiving Education Which is Under the Protection of the 
Constitution by Means of Infringing Upon His/Her Right of Personal name, The Supreme People‟s Court 
2001 
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 In this case, the Supreme People‟s Courts assumed powers not explicitly granted 
but present within a legal family‟ development agenda in order to pursue its 
constitutionally defined mission. There was no direct regulatory competition between 
legal families. Rather, a case occurred in which a conflict between visions of the powers 
of the Supreme Court was occasioned. The decision of that case realigned the movement 
of the total system, leading to a realignment of the movement of its constituent 
subsystems.   
IV. Conclusion 
Legal reforms in China have proceeded at a rapid pace since 1979. They have 
added capabilities, and empowered economic actors. The success of legal reforms in 
China is especially exemplary when compared to the struggles of other transition 
economies. However, the question is, and has always been, what kind of legal system 
should be reintroduced, whether to maximize efficiency or to provide a substantive and 
functional system. This question is complicated by the presence of four distinct legal 
families: the traditional, socialist, civil, and common law families. A legal family is a 
style of social control, a controlling perspective on fundamental procedural distinctions 
that shape the economic efficiency of a legal system.  
A preliminary examination of the presence of the legal families within the 
Chinese legal system points to several questions that have arisen from the examination of 
patterns in this article. Does the Socialist legal family dominate contracting between 
SOEs? Do new commercial laws providing for contractual rights evidence the revival of 
the civil law family? Will there be segmentation of legal systems, in the sense that some 
sectors, locations, or ownership- and risk concerns utilize distinctions in sectors to 
 26 
structure their transactions? For example, Hong Kong under the one country two systems 
policy has an independent judicial system that draws from the common law family.  
The theoretical model advanced in this paper begins with the assertion that several 
distinct legal families may be sourced to China‟s modern legal system. The importance of 
sourcing legal families lies in benchmarking. Benchmarking institutional performance is 
difficult at best and excruciating for the legal system. For example, is the total number of 
cases handled by the legal system a quality indicator? Legal families present a partial 
solution, in that the development of the legal system as an institution may be matched 
against the development umbrella of a specific legal family. One possible direction for 
future research would be to determine which legal family represents maximal efficiency 
given policy makers‟ goals for the legal system.  
In addition, the theoretical model for multiple legal systems identifies a possible 
model for their interaction, the cases of conflict theory. As developed in this paper, the 
cases of conflict theory states that each legal families‟ visions overlaps at specific 
regulatory points. This overlap leads to cases of conflict, wherein legal agents may 
resolve the case in such a manner that a specific legal development umbrella is chosen. 
The entire system then leans towards that legal family. Future research questions may 
then attempt to pair the cases of conflict theory with research into maximum possible 
legal efficiency.  In other words, if a legal system is intrinsically best for national 
development, could that legal system develop in a system characterized by multiple legal 
families? 
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